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THE DURATION OF CERTIFICATIONS BY
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD AND
THE DOCTRINE OF ADMINISTRATIVE STABILITY*
Bernard Cushman

t

T

HE National Labor Relations Act 1 has recently celebrated its
tenth anniversary. A decade is a short time in the life of a statute
and the process of interpretation of an act which marked a new approach to labor relatibns problems is far from ended.. In fashioning
the mosaic of statute and decision which constitutes the basic law for our
varied industrial communities, the National Labor Relations Board
has had to deal with difficult and diverse problems. Not the least important of these questions comprise those involving the duration of the
validity of its certifications. ·
The board in resolving such problems has had to maintain the
delicate balance between the twin statutory goals of freedom of employees to organize and the need for the promotion and maintenance
of industrial stability. In this connection, the board has evolved a
doctrine of administrative stability, a unique and important contribution to our labor law.
The act is silent as to the length of time a certification of an employees' representative by the board remains effective.2 Questions as
to the effective duration of certifications arise in two types of cases.

*
t

The views expressed in this article are entirely those of the writer and nothing
herein is to be construed as representing the opinion of the Department of Labor.
LL.B. Harvard University; member of Massachusetts Bar; Chief of the Legislative and Bureau Services Section of the Solicitor's Office, Department of Labor.
1
49 Stat. L. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. (1940) § 151 et s~q.
2 Section 9 (c) of the act provides that:
"Whenever a question affecting commerce arises concerning the representation of
employees, the Board may investigate such controversy ind certify to the parties, in
writing, the name or names of the representatives that have been designated or selected.
In any such investigation, the Board shall provide for an appropriate hearing upon
1
due notice, either in conjunction with a proceeding under section IO or otherwise, and
may take a secret ballot of employees, or utilize any other suitable method to ascertain
such representatives."
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The validity of the certification may be questioned in unfair labor
practice cases involving charges by a certified union to the effect that
the employer'has refused to bargain with it.8 Such issues may-also be
presented in proceedings for the investigation and certification of representatives.

I
UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE CASES

Unfair labor practice cases involving the question of the duration
of a certification likewise may b_e divided into two groups. The first
class may be described as cases involving a loss of majority by the
certified union subsequent to a refusal to bargain or to other unfair
labor practices by an employer. The second class comprises cases in
which the refusal to bargain occurs allegedly because of a loss of majority-by the certified union subsequent to certification but .prior to the
date of the refusal to bargain.
At least since the case of Franks Bros. Company v. NLRB~ was
decided by the Supreme Court, it seems well settled that where the
loss of majority occurs after the date of the employer's refusal to bargain, the board's order that the employer bargain collectively with the
certified representative is a valid exercise of administrative discretion.
Under·such circumstances, it is immaterial whether the union involved
is one certified by the board prior to the refusal to bargain or one which
demonstrated its majority at the time of the refusal to bargain by some
other appropriate method.
- _In Oughton v. NLRB 5 the court said:
"But, aside from the immateriality of an inquiry into a bargaining agent's status, except as already noted, where the agent's ma8
Sec. 8 of the NLRA provides, inter alia, that it shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer "to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his
, employees, subject to the provisions of Section 9 (a)."
~ fu U.S. 702, 64 S. Ct. 817 (1944). To the same effect are: NLRB v. P.
Lorillard Co., 314 U.S. 512, 62 S. Ct. 397 (1942), per curiam; International Association of Machinists v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 72, 61 S. Ct. 83 (1940); NLRB v. Bradford Dyeing Association, 310 U.S. 318, 60 S. Ct. 918 (1940); NLRB v. CalumetSteel Division of Borg-Warner Corp., (C.C.A. 7th, 1941) 121 F. (2d) 366; Oughton
v. NLRB, (C.C.A. 3d, 1941) 118 F. (2d) 486, 494, on rehearing; M. H. Ritzwoller
Co. v. NLRB, (C.C.A. 7th, 1940) 114 F. (2d) 43-2 at 437,438; Continental Oil Co.
v. NLRB, (C.C.A. 10th, 1940) 113 F. (2d) 473 at 481; Bussmann Mfg. Co. v.
NLRB, {C.C.A. 8th, 1940) 111 F. (2d) 783 at 788; NLRB v. Somerset Shoe Co.,
(C.C.A. 1st, 1940) I I I F. (2d) 681 at 690,691; NLRB v. Highland Park Mfg. Co.,
(C.C.A. 4th, 1940) 110 F. (2d) 632.
5
(C.C.A. 3d, 1941) n8 F. (2d) 486, u8 F. (2d) 494 at 497.
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jority support has been assailed in a complaint proceeding for the
dissipation of unfair labor practices, Courts of Appeals generally
have affirmed findings made by Board upon the presumed continuity of the bargaining agent's majority support, there being
unfair labor practices by the employer contemporaneously present."
The theory of the presumption of continuity of majority representation has been advanced in many court cases.6 In the Whittier
Mills case, the board certified the union on November 1, 1937. The
unfair labor practices found by the board took place in June and July
of 1938, after there had been a material change due to a curtailment of
operations in the composition of the bargaining unit found appropriate
by the board. The respondent resisted the 8(5) order on the ground,
inter alia, that certification was no longer valid in view of the changed
circumstances. The court stated:
"The statute does not say how long a certificate of representation
shall stand good. It is not intended to be ephemeral, nor should it
be perpetual. On general principle, since it ascertains a status as
existing, the presumption is that the status continues until shown
to have ceased. The employer is, in theory at least, not much concerned, since the employees are to choose their representative unhindered. So long as the employees make no contention that they
are not correctly represented, it would seem that the employer
could safely continue to deal indefinitely with the designated bargaining agent. In the present case the employees have not protested at all, and the employer has raised the question belatedly.
Assuming the question duly raised, the Board decided it adversely. There is no certain evidence that a majority of the present
employees do not now desire representation by the Committee.
. . . The present wishes of a majority of the employees are not
established either way. The presumption of the continuance of
the established status justifies the Board's finding that the Committee is still the representative designed ·and selected by the majority." 1
.In several early cases, the courts regarded the presumption of continuing majority status as a rebuttable one. The validity of the order
to bargain was bottomed upon a failure of the employer to demonstrate
6
Colorado Fuel & Iron Corp: v. NLRB, (C.C.A. 10th, 1941) 121 F. (2d)
165; Valley Mould & Iron Corp. v. NLRB, (C.C.A. 7th, 1940) 116 F. (2d) 760;
NLRB v. National Motor Bearing Co., (C.C.A. 9th, 1939) 105 F. (2d) 652.
1
(C.C.A. 5th, 1941) I I I F. (2d) 474·
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that the union with which the.employer was ordered to bargain was a
' minority urµon.
In Valley Mould and Iron Corp. v. NLRB,8 however, the court
advanced the theory that the presumption was conclusive. The court
was of the opinion that the board's certification is yalid- until set aside
by the board itself or by the courts. The more recent cases have recognized the principle that a loss of majority due to unfair labor practices will not operate to overturn a representative freely selected by
a majority of employees. The validity of the order to bargain is not to
be sustained on a theory of presumption, however, but on the reasonableness of the board's exercise of its discretion in determining how the
effects of unremedied unfair labor practices may be dissipated. In
Franks Bros. Co. v. NLRB, the Court held that, upon a-finding that
the employer had unlawfully refused to bargain with the duly designated representative of his employees, the board could properly order
him to bargain with that labor organization even though, after the refusal to bargain, the majority status of the organization had been lost
due to normal personnel turnover. The Court stated that a bargaining
relationship once legally established must be operative for a reasonable
period and thus afforded a fair opportunity to succeed. The Court also,
pointed out that the policy of the act to promote collective bargaining
would be defeated and the employer would profit from his own wrongdoing if he were allowed to question the continued m~jority status of
the bargaining representative after his unlawful refusal to bargain.
The question as to the duration' of the board's certification has been
squarely presented in a group of cases wherein the employer has attempted to justify a refusal to bargain upon the theory of an uncoerced
loss of majority occurring subsequent to the issuance of certification by
the board, but prior to the refusal to bargain.9 In those cases both the
board and the courts held that in the interests of soundJ administration
the board's_ certification must be held to have a reasonable degree of
' durability,_ and that, at least for a re asonable period subsequent to
·certification, 'the duty to bargain on the part of the employer remains.
0

8

(C.C.A. 7th, 1940) n6 F. (2d) 760.
NLRB v. Grieder Machine Tool and Die Co., (C.C.A. 6th, 1944) 142 F.
(2d) 163; NLRB v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., (C.C.A. 4th, 1944) 140 F. (2d)
217, enforcing, as modified, 47 N.L.R.B. 821 (1943) Compare: NLRB v. Inter-City
Advertising Co., Inc., (C.C.A. 4th, 1946) 154 F. (2d) 244; NLRB v. Century
Oxford Mfg. Corp., (C.C.A. 2d, 1944) _140 F. (2d) 541; NLRB v. Botany Worsted
Mills, (C.C.A. 3d, 1943) 133 F. (2d) 876.
9
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In NLRB v. Appalachian Electric Power Co.,1° approximately ten
weeks after certification, a petition signed by the employees, indicating
that a majority of the employees in the appropriate unit no longer desired the certified representative as their bargaining agent, was presented to the company. Thereafter, the company refused to bargain
with the certified union on the ground that the union hacl lost its majority. The court stated: 11
"Accordingly, when the Board, after following the proper
statutory procequre, has given certification to a unit, this certification must be honored by the company so long as it remains in
force, at least for a reasonable time. To assume that the Board's
certification speaks with certainty only for the day of its issuance
and that a Company may, with impunity, at any time thereafter refuse to bargain collectively on the ground that a change of sentiment has divested the duly certified representative of its majority
status would lead to litigious bedlam and judicial chaos."
The court further said: 12
"Since the Act does not prescribe the length of time for which
any given certification shall remain valid, we accept the legal
conclusion of the Board that the Company must recognize the
certified representative for a reasonable period of time after the
issuance of the certification, or until the certification is either set
aside or replaced by an appropriate action of the Board in accord
with the Act."
·
3
Simifarly, in NLRB v. Botany Worsted Mills,1 a petition by a
majority of the employees purporting to revoke prior authorizations
of a certified union and presented to the employer approximately one
week after certification was held to Se insufficient ground to dissipate the
validity of the board's certification. In NLRB v. Century Oxford Mfg.
Corp., 14 a petition signed by a majority of the employees, stating that
they no longer desired the union to represent them where the union
had previously won a consent election, was held to be insufficient to
undermine the validity of the result of the election conducted by the
board. The petition was completed al}d presented to the employer
10

(C.C.A. 4th, 1944) 140 F. (2d) 217.
Id. at 221.
12 Id. at 222.
13
(C.C.A. 3d, 1943) 133 F. (2d) 876, cert. denied, 319 U.S. 751, 63 S. Ct.
u64. (1943).
'
14
(C.C.A. 2d, 1944) 140 F. (2d) 541, cert. denied, 323 U.S. 714, 65 S. Ct.
40 (1944).
11

6
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shortly after the consent election was held. The board, in its decision
found that the union's majority was not affected as a result of the consummation of the petition. The board said:
"Normally the administrative processes of the Act afford the
best method of resolving doubts concerning employees' sentiment, once such sentiment has been tested in an election and a
reasonable time has not since elapsed. Problems arising from
alleged shifts of allegiance following Board elections are among
the most difficult with which this Board is confronted. In considering such allegations, the Board must balance the advantages of
stability in collective bargaining against the desirability of affording employees full freedom of choice of representatives; The
Board has atte~pted to achieve a balance between these conflicting policies by refusing to entertain representation petitions within
a reasonable period after an election, except where unusual circumstances intervene. Without such a rule, collective bargaining
would be deprived of stability, and administrative determinations
would become ephemeral. In a case such as this, where no such
unusual -circumstances are present, no reasonable doubt can be
entertained concerning the continued efficacy of a certification." 15
In the Matter of Grieder Machine Tool and Die Company 16 approximately two months after certification, the respondent, during the
course of negotiations- with the certified union ceased negotiations because of a petition filed with the board by a rival union. The Regional
Director for the Eighth Region refused to issue notice of hearing on
the petition, and a subsequent appeal by the rival union was dismissed
by the board. N egotiatic;ms were never resumed thereafter nor did
either the respondent or the union communicate with each other. The
Trial Examiner found that the respondent was under an absolute duty
to bargain collectively with the union as the exclusive bargaining agent
so long as the certification remained.in effect. A majority of the board
affirmed the Trial Examiner's findings.
The board's doctrine of admininstrative stability has been criticized by
Justice Rutledge as vesting in a union rights overriding the freedom of
choice guaranteed to employees under the National Labor Relations
Act. In Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 17 a majority of the em47 N.L.R.B. 835 at 846 (1943).
49 N.L.R.B. 1325 (1943), enforced in NLRB v. Grieder Machine Tool and
Die Co., (C.C.A. 6th, 1944) 142 F. (2d) 163, cert. denied, 323 U.S. 724, 65
S. Ct. 56 (1944).
17
321 U.S. 678, 64 S. Ct. 830 (1944).
15

16
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ployees in a small business establishment had designated a collective
bargaining representative. Shortly thereafter, and before any agreement had been reached between the representative and the employer,
a majority of the individual employees in the unit, without revoking
the designation of the union as their representative, requested the em~
player to bargain directly with them as a group. The board and the
Court, Justice Rutledge dissenting, found that the employer's acquiescence in this request constituted a refusal to bargain.
Justice Rutledge felt that employees were entitled to change or
dismiss their representative whenever they desired to do so. He suggested that a limitation might be imposed on this freedom with reference to large units in the interest of industrial stability because of the
difficulty ·of ascertaining in such situations whether a majority exists
at any given time. He distinguished cases involving small units since
majority status is ordinarily easily d~terminable in such establishments.
Justice Rutledge considers the designation of a union and bargaining agent as governed by common-law doctrines of agency. If this is
true, it would, of course, follow that since the agency is not one coupled
with an interest, the agency is revocable at will. Such a concept would
seem to be totally inapplicable to the rapidly changing field of labor
relations. Attempts to apply common-law concepts to that field have
traditionally been ine:ffectual.18
Historically, the trade union, as an institution, has developed along
lines incompatible with common-law notions applicable to ordinary
business relationships. The role of the labor organization in our evolving industrial community would appear to be more closely analogous
to that of an elected public official rather than to that of the familiar
commercial representative.19 Generally speaking, a collective bargaining agreement, if for a reasonable duration, fixes the term of office
and operates as the statutory law governing the industrial relationship
in a particular plant for a given period of time. Frequently, a public
official's constituents become dissatisfied with his conduct in office.
18

See, for example, the recent reversal of the Maryland Drydock decision, 49
N.L.R.B. 733 (1943), holding that foremen could not constitute appropriate collective bargaining units. Matter of Packard Motor Co., 61 N.L.R.B. 4 (1945). The
attempt in the Maryland Drydock case to apply common-law doctrines applicable to
the trustee-beneficiary relationship to the employee-employer relationship i:esulted in
widespread work-stoppages and, as a practical matter, failed to stem increased organizational efforts on the part of foremen.
19
The legislative history of the political analogy and the development of the
principle of majority rule under the NLRA are discussed in a recent article, Weyand,
"Majority Rule in Collective Bargaining," 45 CoL. L. REv. 556 (1945).

8
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Nevertheless, in the absence of impeachment or a statute permitting
recall, the incumbent, in the interest of administrative stability, has,
under our American system, been expected to cq_mplete his term of office. Similar considerations would se~m to require that once a bargaining representative has been duly designated, that designation, except
in extraordinary circumstances, must, in the interest of stability, remain
operative for a reasonable period of time and cannot be revoked at
every whimsy of the electorate.
The function of the union has been described as legislative.20 The
National Labor Relations Act was designed to encourage collective
bargaining as well as to protect individual freedom of choice. Clearly,
collective bargaining would be rendered ineffectual if the majority
status of a recently certified union were to be subject to daily scrutiny
by an employer~ Legal concepts rooted in an era of emerging capitalism
with its numerous small individual employer-units have little application to the collective employer-employee relationship as it exists today
in giant modern corporate establishments employing large numbers of
persons.
It is true, of course, that employees should be substantially as free
to abandon a labor organization as they are to· join it. But freedom of
choice does not postulate the indulgence of every caprice which an employee may entertain. Labor law must be adapted to the dynamic
structure of industrial relationship. The board has recognized that the
right to change representatives is not an unqualified one. Successful
application of the principles of industrial democracy guaranteed in the
act ·r~quire that the choice of a representative carry with it a degree of
durability. The right to recall the statutory representative may properly be suspended for a reasonable period. The price of freedom to
bargain collectively is responsibility in the exercise of the privilege of
.
I
'
,·
·
ch01ce.
Majority status may change from day to day in a particular company due to fluctuations in employment. Without a degree of durability, a collective bargaining relationship cannot operate successfully.
And this would seem to be as true of small establishments as of large
ones. Accordingly, unless the defection from the union encompasses
virtually the entire membership of the union, the NLRB has refused
to direct an election during the life of,an agreement for a reasonable
20
Steele v. Lohisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 at 198, 65 S. Ct.
226 (1944).
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term. Where, however, almost the entire membership of the union has
transferred to a rival union so that the administration of industrial government has broken down completely, the board has directed an election.21 This theory, in substance, recognizes the fact of revolution in
the industrial community. In such a context the stability induced by
the application of the doctrine would be illusory. The revolutionary
impulse induced by the virtually complete switch of affiliation, in the
absence of an orderly avenue for realization, might well express itself
through the medium of the strike, a result the act was intended to
obviate.22
Insofar as a loss of majority is concerned, the board has distinguished between the effect to be given to the act of voluntary recognition of a labor organization by an employer as the exclusive bargaining
representative of his employees and the effect to be given to a certification of a bargaining representative by the board. In M(l-tter of Joe
Hearin, Lwmber,28 the board held that a loss of majority subsequent to
21

Matter of Olive & Myers Manufacturing Company, 59 N.L.R.B. 650 (1944);
Matter of Robert P. Scherer, doing business as Gelatin Products Company, 49
N.L.R.B. 173 (1943); Matter of Nashville Bridge Company, 49 N.L.R.B. 629
(1942); Matter of National Lead Company, 45 N.L.R.B. 182 (1943); Matter of
Seale~ Power Corporation, 41 N.L.R.B. 1225 (1942); Matter of United Stove Company, 30 N.L.R.B. 305 (1941); cf. Matter of Great Lakes Carbon Corporation, 44
N.L.R.B. 70 (1942)~ The board has likewise directed an election under these circumstances shortly after certification even though no contract was in existence. Matter
of Carson Pirie Scott & Company, 69 N.L.R.B., No. 112 (July 25, 1946).
22 The NLRB has refused to entertain a "no-union" petition. Matter of Tabardrey Manufacturing Company, 51 N.L.R.B. 246 (1943). The board rested its
decision on the ground that the act makes no provision- for an employee petition for
decertification. Despite a lack of express statutory authority, the board has permitted
an employer, however, to interplead two rival unions through the medium. of a representation petition where each union has claimed bargaining rights. NLRB, RuLES
AND REGULATIONS, Series 3, as amended, art. III, sec. 1, 2 (b) (1944). By refusing
to permit employees to p.etition the board for a revocation of an existing certification
the board has, in effect, construed the act in favor of the retention of collective bargaining. The result has been, of course, to favor union organization and to rende,
difficult the abandonment of a union. Presumably, the board regards the absence of
organization as a state of industrial a.narchy and will refuse to recognize revolution
resulting in the absence of industrial government.
28
66 N.L.R.B., No. 150 (March 28, 1946); affirmed, Supplemental Decision,
Matter of Joe Hearin, Lumber, 68 N.L.R.B., No. 21 (May 21, 1946), The Regional
Director, after he conducts a cross-check showing that the union involved has been
designated by a majority of the employees in an agreed unit, posts notices to that effect
on the employer's premises for a period of five days during which the employees
or any interested party can show cause to the Regional Director why he should not
issue a Report on Cross Check finding that the union has been designated as the

IO
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recognition of a union based upon a card check conducted by an NLRB
official demonstrating that the union had been designated as their representative by a majority of the employees in ~n agreed unit, excused a
refusal to bargain by the employer even though· the refusal to bargain
took place less than four months from the date of the card check. The
, board stated that a card check did not represent as valid an indication
of the employees' true desire with respect to representation as does an
election conducted by secret ballot under the auspices of the board.
It might be contended that the exercise of choice through the medium of a secret ballot affords guarantees of integrity of selection not
present in other methods of union designation. On the other hand, an
employer's voluntary recognition of a union is presumably legitimate.24
To give greater weight to certification in the absence of any evidence
of unlawful assistance, would place a premium on resort to the administrative processes of the act and would discourage voluntary recognition. Industrial stability is as desirable in cases of voluntary recognition
as in cases of certification. The doctrine of administrative stability has
equally great usefulness in situations involving voluntary recognition.
The National War Labor Board has given the same effect to employer
recognition as it has to certification.25 That position, in the absence of
any suggestion of unfair labor practices, seems to reflect the better view.

II
REPRESENTATION CASES

The doctrine of administrative stability has its most varied applications in representation cases. In many cases the certified bargaining
agent has entered into a contract with the employer covering the employees whom a rival labor organization seeks to represent. In' such
situations the board has attempted to balance the conflicting interests
of employees and the public in maintaining the stability of relationships
· previously established by collective bargaining contracts and the interexclusive representative of the employees in the unit. If the Regional Director, at the
conclusion of -the five-day period, is of the opinion that no valid cause to the contrary
has been shown and issues such a Report, no distinction will be made between the
effect to be given to a certification and the effect to be given to a Regional Director's
Report. This procedure was not followed in the Hearin case.
24
Matter of Detroit Michigan Stove Company, 51 N.L.R.B. 347 at 349 (1944).
25 Hook Motor Lines, No. I I 1-4734-D (Sept. 9, 1944); Steffens Ice & Ice
Cream Co., No. 111-1568-D (Feb. 11, 1944) (both unreported).
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est in the freedom of employees to change their representatives whenever they choose to do so.28
The board has said that its certifications will be considered operative for a reasonable time, usually one year.21 In representation cases,
it has been the board's general practice to dismiss petitions where substantially less than a year has elapsed since the issuance of certification
by the board or since the execution of a contract with a certified union
covering the employees sought to be represented by a petitioning rival
organization.28 A review of the board's decisions demonstrates the socalled one year rule is in reality a yardstick rather than a fixed rule of
procedure. As in comparable situations in other fields of law, what is
a reasonable time is to be determined on the basis of the facts of the
particular case. However, the board's holdings indicate certain rules
of decision evolved by the agency which may be applied to particular
types of cases.
A. Cases in which a Certification is Operative for a Period of
Longer than One Year. Where a written contract has been entered
into between an employer and a labor organization which is for a reasonable term, the board will not disturb the status of the certified union
during the life of the contract. Accordingly, where the contracting
union has been certified prior to the execution of the original contract,
the certification is, as a practical matter, effectjve for a period of more
28
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BoARD, SEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT 54 (1943);
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, EIGHTH ANNUAL REPORT 45 (1944); NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BoARD, NINTH ANNUAL REPORT 25 (1945); Matter of
The Trailer Company of America, 51 N.L.R.B. II06 (1943); Matter of Mill· B,
Inc., 40 N.L.R.B. 346 (1942).
27 Matter of Aluminum Company of America, Newark Works, 57 N.L.R.B. 913
(1944); Matter of Bohn Aluminum and Brass Corporation, 57 N.L.R.B. 1684 (1944)
( the board refused to direct an election on petition of rival organizations, approximately four and one half months after certification although all employees in the unit
had notified the company they had withdrawn their membership in the certified
organization); Matter of Aluminum Company of America, 52 N.L.R.B. 1040 (1943);
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, FIFTH ANNUAL REPORT 55 (1940).
28
Matter of Aluminum Company of America, Newark Works, 57 N.L.R.B. 913
(1944); Matter of Bohn Aluminum and Brass Corporation, 57 N.L.R.B. 1684
(1944); Matter of Detroit and Cleveland Navigation Co., 29 N.L.R.B. 176 (1941);
Matter of Eaton Manufacturing Company, 29 N.L.R.B. 53 (1941); Matter of Leo
Hart Co., Inc., 26 N.L.R.B. 125 (1940); Matter of The Hettrick Manufacturing
Company, 25 N.L.R.B. 722 (1940); Matter of The National Sugar Refining Co.,
IO N.L.R.B. 1410 (1939); Matter of Superior Electrical Products Co., 6 N.L.R.B.
19 (1938).
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than one year.29 Likewise, a written agreement renewed for a further
term as a result of the operation of an automatic renewal clause, in the
absence of a claim by a rival union, asserted prior to the date of automatic renewal, will be treated as a new agreement.80
If i~ is the custom in a p~rticular industry to make long-term contracts, -an agreement for a longer period than one year will be held a
bar to a representation petition filed one year after the ~ecution of a
contract.81
In order to operate as a bar to an election, an agreement must be
in writing,82 _grant recognition to the contracting union as exclusive bar29 The board has stated that ordinarily the certified union has a one year period
in which to negotiate an agreement, and has held that a contract executed ten months
after certification, and subsequent to the filing of a representation petition by a rival
•union, is a bar to a direction of election for the contract term. Matter of Con P.
Curran Printing Company, 67 N.L.R.B., No. 192 (May 15, 1946). To the same
effect is Matter of Omaha Packing Company, 67 N.L.R.B., No. 40 (April 12, 1946), ,
where a contract for a term of approximately fifteen months entered into between the
employer and the cert,ified union about nine months after certification was held a bar
to a direction of election.
·
so Matter <;>f Marvel-S~hebler Division Borg-Warner Corporation, 56 N.L.R.B.
105 (1944); Matter of The Cleveland Container Company, 47 N.L.R.B. 1309
(1943); Matter of North Range Mining Co., 47 N.L.R.B. 1306 (1943); Matter of
Mill B, Inc., 40 N.L.R.B. 346 (1942). Recently the board has held that the mere
informal assertion of a claim of majority representation ordinarily will not be sufficient
to prevent the operation of an automatic renewal clause in an existing valid contract
as a bar to a determination of representatives. The automatic renewal will not be
de(,med effective, however, if within ten days of the assertion of a claim of majority
representation prior to the automatic renewal of the contract, a formal representation
petition is filed with the board. Matter of Henry and Allen, Inc., 68 N.L.R.B., No.
97 (June 19, 1946). In Matter of General Electric X-Ray Corp., 67 N.L.R.B., No.
121 (April 30, 1946), the board departed from it!S former practice of according equal
weight to informal claims and informal petitions in determining whether subsequently
executed agreements constitute a. bar to a direction of election, holding that when a
petition is filed more than ten days after the assertion of a bare claim, and no extenuating circumstances appear, an otherwise valid agreement which is executed in the
interval will bar a determination of representatives.
81
Matter of Ball Brothers Company, 54 N.L.R.B. 1512 (1944); Matter of
Daniel Burkhartsmeier Cooperage Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 428 (1943); Matter of Joseph
P. Cattie and Brothers, Inc., 47 N.L.R.B. 81 (1943); Matter of Eicor, Inc., 46
N.L.R.B. lOH (1943).
.
82 Matter of Crescent Bed Co., Inc., 29 N.L.R.B. 34 (1941); Matter of Pressed
Steel Car Company, Inc., 7 N.L.R.B. 1099 (1938); Matter of Santa Fe Trails
Transportation Co., 7 N.L.R.B. 358 (1938); Matter of Unit Cast Corporation, 7
N.L.R.B. 129 (1938); Matter of Diamond· Iron Works, 6 N.L.R.B. 94 (1938);
Matter of City Auto Stamping Company, 3 N.L'.R.B. 306 (1937); Matter of General
Mills, Inc., 3 N.L.R.B. 730 (1937); Matter of Northrop Corporation, 3 N.L.B.R.
228 (1937); Matter of Pennsylvania Gi-eyhound Lines, 3 N.L.R.B. 622 at 640:
(1937).
'
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gaining agent,88 provide for substantive terms covering conditions of
employment,84 and cover· an appropriate unit.85
The board's recognition of the significance of the inauguration of
wartime controls has occasionally resulted in the extension of the usual
one-year rule. Where a newly recognized or certified collective bargaining agent has failed to obtain an initial contract because of the necessity of securing approval or determination of the National War
Labor Board with respect to important terms of the contract, the board
has refused to entertain a representation petition from a rival organization. This has been true, even though the circumstances are such that
in peacetime the board normally would direct an election.
In Matter of Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Company,86 shortly
after a C.I.O. union won a consent election, the company and the
union adopted an agreement between the company and a prior bargaining representative until such time as a new agreement was negotiated
and executed by the parties. The parties reached agreement on some
issues but not on others. The issues on which the parties could not
reach an agreement had been submitted to the National War Labor
Board for determination in connection with disputes between the C.I.O.
and the company at other plants of the company. The parties in the
instant case agreed in writing to accept in principle the War Labor
Board rulings on the disputed issues. Shortly before the War Labor
Board issued its final directive order in these cases, a rival union filed a
petition for certification with the NLRB. The parties soon after receipt
of the War Labor Board order executed a contract for one year embodying, in substari.ce, the War Labor Board's decision on the disputed
issues. The NLRB held that the contract thus executed was a bar to
a new determination of representatives although well over a year had
elapsed since the pa'.rties had entered into a contractual relationship and
almost two years had expired since the holding of the election. The
board dismissed the rival union's petition for an election stating: 87
8

Matter of Standard Oil Company of Indiana, 56 N.L.R.B. IIOI (1944);
Matter·of Corn Products Refining Company, 52 N.L.R.B: 1324 (1943). Matter of
Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Company, 50 N.L.R.B. 306 (1943). Matter of Henry
Weis Mfg. Co., Inc., 49 N.L.R.B, 5n (1943).
H Matter of Dolese & Shepard Company, 56 N.L.R.B. 532 (1944); Cf. Matter
of Kinnear Manufacturing Company, 4 N.L.R.B. 773 (1938).
85
Matter of Inland Container Corporation, 47 N.L.R.B. 952 (1943); Ma~ter of
Owens-Illinois Pacific Coast Co., 36 N.L.R.B. 990 (1941).
86
50 N.L.R.B. 306 (1943).
87
Id. at 3 12. The board has applied the Allis-Chalmers doctrine in the following cases: Matter of Wentworth Bus Lines, Inc., 64 N.L.R.B. 65 (1945); Matter of
~
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" ... Under the circumstances of this case we are of the opin- _
ion that it would not effectuate the policies of the Act to order an
election at the present time. Such an election might serve to negate the proceedings of the War Labor Board, require new proceedings before that Board, and create uncertainty and unsettled
bargaining conditions for an additional indeterminate period.
From the standpoint of stable labor relations, it is undesirable to
penalize a certified bargaining representative for unavoidable delays consequent upon its voluntary acceptance pf orderly procedures established by governmental authority for the adjustment of
differences with an employer. To charge a certified bargaining
representative with such delays would have the effect of discouraging resort to such orderly procedures and promoting industrial
strife and unrest which the Act w:as designed to avoid."
Subsequent decisions of the board make it clear, however, that the
Allis-Chalmers doctrine will not be extended by the board to every
case in which proceedings are pending before the War Labof Board
involving a dispute between a previously recognized or certified union.
Where the recognized or certified union has in fact enjoyed the benefits of excl~sive representation for a reasonable period of time the board
will entertain an appropriate representation petition.88 The mere fact
that a proceeding is pending before the War Labor Board in which an
intervening union is concerned is not sufficient to bar a new determination of representatives.89 The Allis-Chalmers doctrine applies only
when the organization involved in War Labor 13oard proceedings is
newly recognized or newly certified.40
B. Cases in which a Certification is Effective for a Period of Less
than One Year. Where the contracting or certified union has formally
dissolved subsequent to the issuance of certification or the execution of
Montgomery Ward & Company, 60 N.L.R.B. 574 (1945); Matter of Taylor Forge
and Pipe Works, 58 N.L.R.B. 1375 (1944).
38
Matter of Fuld & Hatch knitting Company, 67 N.L.R.B., No. 133 (April,
1946); Matter of Great Lakes Carbon Corporation, 57 N.L.R.B. II5 (1944); Matter
of Corning Glass Works, 54 N.L.R.B. 963 (1944); Matter of Foster-Grant Co., Inc.,
54 N.L.R.B. 802 (1944); Matter of Fort Dodge Creamery Co., 53 N.L.R.:B. 928
(1943); Matter of MacClatchie Manufacturing Company, 53 N.L.R.B. 1268 (1943);
Matter of Columbia Protektosite Co., Inc., 52 N.L.R.B. 595 (1943); Matter of
Americus J. Leonard, 5I N.L.R.B. 1424 (1943).
89
Matter of International Harvester Company, 55 N.L.R.B. 497 (1944); Matter
of Landis Machine Company, 54 N.L.R.B. 1440 (1944).
40
Matter of Aluminum Company of America, Vancouver, Washington, 58
N.L.R.B. 24, (19441; Matter of Aluminum Company of America, Vancouver, Washington, 53 N.L.R.B. 593 (1943); Matter of Kennecott Copper Corporation, 51
N.L.R.B. u4O (1943).
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the contract, or where, due to the existence of a schism in the union
or the defection of substantially the entire membership the continued
existence or the identity of the union was in doubt, the board has directed elections.41 The board has, likewise, directed an election where,
during the life of a contract for a reasonable term, the contracting union
has become defunct.42
The requirements of the war emergency necessarily have quickened the ordinary process of industrial expansion. The advent of the
war economy compelled the rapid construction and expansion of industrial establishments. The manpower requirements of these new or expanded plants were filled by the gradual acquisition o'f a working force.
The question arose as to the period at which the board would permit
elections to be held in these so-called expanding unit -situations. In
such circumstances, the board was required to decide whether to proceed to a determination of representatives prior to the time a full complement of employees is hired so that the employees already at work
might immediately enjoy the benefits of the collective bargaining procedures provided by the NLRA or to postpone for an indefinite period
the holding of an election and deny to a large group of employees the
rights guaranteed in the act. A correlative problem posed by the ex41
Matter of Carson Pirie Scott & Company, 69 N.L.R.B., No. 112 (July a5,
1946); Matter of Armour Leather Company of Delaware, 51 N.L.R.B. 1091
(1943); Matter of Central Pattern and Foundry Company, 51 N.L.R.B. 400 (1943);
Matter of Wilson Packing and Rubber Company, 51 N.L.R.B. 910 (1943); Matter
of Morrison Steel Products, Inc., 50 N.L.R.B. 72 (1943); Matter of Nashville Bridge
Company, 49 N.L.R.B. 629 (1943); Matter of Robert P. Scherer, doing business as
Gelatin Products Company, 49 N.L.R.B. 173 (1943); Matter of Kay and Ess Company, 48 N.L.R.B. 1387 (1943); Matter of Sunshine Mining Company, 48 N.L.R.B.
fo1 (1943); Matter of Atlantic Waste Paper Company, Inc., 45 N.L.R.B. 1087
(1942); Matter of Lone Star Cement Corporation, 45 N.L.R.B. 1298 (1942); Matter of National Lead Company, 45 N.L.R.B. 182 (1.942); Matter of Brenizer Trucking Company, 44 N.L.R.B. 810 (1942); Matter of California Central Fibre
Corporation, 44 N.L.R.B. 1226 (1942); Matter of Harbison-Walker Refractories Co.,.
44 N.L.R.B. 1280 (1942).
42
Matter of Black-Clawson Company, 63 N.L.R.B. 773 (1945); Matter of The
Swartwout Company, 61 N.L.R.B. 832 (1945); Matter of Container Corporation of
America, 61 N.L.R.B. 823 (1945); Matter of Vulcan Corporation, 58 N.L.R.B. 733
(1944); Matter of Sunshine Mining Company, 48 N.L.R.B. 301 (1943); Matter of
Precision Casting Co., Inc., 48 N.L.R.B. 835 (1943). In Matter of Helena Rubenstein, Inc., 47 N.L.R.B. 435 (1943), on July 27, 1942 the board issued an order
requiring the employer to bargain with a local of the United Mine Workers, District
50. In September, 1942 the local became defunct. On February 11, 1943 the board
directed an election on petition of a C.I.O. union and stated that, under the circumstances, the order to bargain was no longer operative.

16

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

paneling unit was the question as to the period for which a certification
issued under these circumstances should be considered as operative.
' Where a substantial and representative group of employees was
presently employed and the circumstances were such ·that a refusal to
hold an election would unduly delay collective bargaining for such employees, the board has proceeded to an immediate determination of
representatives but has .provided that under appropriate circumstances
it .would entertain a representation petition within less than one year
·after,certification.48 In Matter of Aluminum Company of America,"
the company had in its employ at the time of the hearing approximately
30 per cent of its anticipated full complement of employees. It was expected that the full complement of employees would be reached in
about seven months after the hearing. The board ordered an election.
The evidence revealed that. 50 per cent of the quota might not be
reached for two or more months after the issuance of the decision. The
board stated that: 45
"· .• Accordingly, we shall entertain a new representation petition affecting the employees involved herein within a period less
than r year, but not before the expiration of 6 months, from the
date of any certification which we may issue in the instant 'proceedings, upon proof ( r) that the number of employees in the
appropriate unit 'is more than double the number of employees
eligible to vote in the election hereinafter directed; and ( 2) that
the petitioning labor organization represents· a substantial number
of employees.in the expanded unit."
Where, however, 'the company has in its employ approximately
one-half of the contemplated full roster, the board has certified the
Matter of Kroehler Manufacturing Company, 45 N.L.R.B. n51 (1942);
Matter of Atlas Powder Co., 41 N.L.R.B. 127 (1942); Mattei: of Precision Manufacturing Corporation, 49 N.L.~.B. 438 (1942); Matter of Westinghouse Electric
and Manufacturing Co., 38 N.L.R.B. 404 (1942); See Matter of Aluminum Company of America, Torrance Plant, 51 N.L.R.B. 1295 (1943); Matter of Aluminum
Company of America, Mead Aluminum Plant, 49 N.L.R.B. 1431 (1942).
The board has also taken cognizance of the requirements of the reconversion
period and has entertained a representation petition filed less than one year after issuance
of certification "{hen it has been demonstrated that an ~mployer's operations as a
result of the transition from war to civilian production have been materially changed
and ·there has been a substantial reduction in personnel. Matter of Electric Sprayit
Company, 67 N.L.R.B., No. 101 (April 25, 1946) (Board Member Houston dissenting) ; Matter of American Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corp., 67 N.L.R.B.,
No. 147 (May 3, 1946); Matter of M. P. Mollar, Inc., 56 N.L.R.B. 16 (1944).
44
52 N.L.R.B. 1040 (1943).
45
Id. at 1046, 1047 (1943).
43
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designated union without any limitation of the so-called one year
rule/ 8
•
III
THE EFFECT OF A DIRECTION OF ELECTION UPON
AN EXISTING CERTIFICATION

The board recently has considered the problem of the application
of the doctrine of administrative stability to situations in which an election is directed upon petition of a rival union at or near the expiration
of a contract between a certified uhion and the employer.47
In Matter of Phelps Dodge Copper Products Corporation, Habirshaw Cable and Wire Division,48 an American Federation of Labor
union was certified by NLRB on February 4, 1941. Thereafter, the
employer and the union executed two successive contracts containing,
inter alia, maintenance of membership provisions.
Approximately two months prior to the expiration date of the second contract a C.I.O. union filed a representation petition with the
NLRB. Immediately prior to the expiration date of the contract the
•board. directed an election. The board found that upon the expiration
date of the contract with the A.F. of L. union, the substantive provisions of the agreement, as well as the grievance machinery provided in
the contract, were tacitly continued in effect pending the outcome of the
election proceeding. The employer continued to deal with the A.F. of
L. with reference to grievances during the pr.e-election period in accordance with the established grievance procedure. The board found,
however, that the C.I.O. had never requested an opportunity to take
up grievances with management in behalf of· its adherents· and was
never denied that privilege. The board was of the opinion that, under
these circumstances, there was nothing in the employer's conduct in
dealing with the A.F. of L. concerning grievances that was inconsistent
with the provisions of the act.
The board went on to say, however, that: 49
" ..• We are of the opinion that if, during the pendency of an
46

Matter of Remington Rand, Inc., 50 N.L.R.B. 819 (1943); Matter of Pullman-Standard Car Manufacturing Company, 49 N.L.R.B. 542 (1943); Matter of
Hughes Tool Company, 45 N.L.R.B. 821 (1942); Matter of Irwin-Pedersen Arms
Company, 45·N.L.R.B. 920 (1942). '
47
The effect of the issuance of a board certification upon the legal status of a
contract between the employer and a rival union is a question which is not .withi,n
the scope of this article.
48
63 N.L.R.B. 686 (1945), 17 LAB. REL. REP. 48 (1945).
49
17 LAB. REL. REP. 48 at 49 (1945). The statement is obiter for the question
of extension of contract as an unfair labor practice was not raised before the board.
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election directed by the Board to resolve a question concerning representation, an employer extends or renews an existing contract
with a labor organization, or makes a new one, he violates the Act
insofar as that organization is accorded recognition as exclusive
bargaining representative or employees are required to become or
remain members thereof as a condition of employment."
In the course of the Phelps-Dodge opinion the: board had to consider three problems: (r) whether, during the pendency of an election directed by the board, it is proper for an employer to extend the
terms of an expiring contract pending the outcome of the representation proceeding; (2) the extent to which, under such circumstances, an
employer may treat, concerning grievances, with either or both of two
competing unions; (3) whether, under similar circumstances, it is
permissible for an employer to extend a union security provision of an
expiring contract pending the determination of the representation
.question.
A. Extension of Contracts during the Pendency of a Representation Proceeding. The board made it clear that it considered that an
employer who, subsequent to a direction of election among rival unions,
_extends an expiring contract calling for exclusive recognition of one of
the rival unions until the representation question is determined by the
board is guilty of an unfair labor practice. In support of its holding
the board referred to three cases previously decided by it: Matter of
Elastic Stop Nut Corpo_ration,5° Matter of Keyston; Steel and Wire
Company,5-1 and Matter of John Engelhorn and Sons. 52
· In the Eng;lhorn case the employer had been in contractual relationship with an A.F. of L. union. The contract expired. A rival
C.I.O. union filed a representation petition with NLRB. Thereafter,
and prior to the determination of the representation question, the employer and the A.F. of L. union executed a new agreement, providing
for a closed shop, for a one year term. The board found that the execution of the agreement in the face of a pending representation petition
constituted, per se, a violation of section 8 ( r) of the act. 58 The board
50

51 N.L.R.B. 694 (1943), enforced in Elastic Stop Nut Corporation v. NLRB,
(C.C.A. 8th, 1944) 142 F. (2d) 371, cert. denied, 323 U.S. 722, 65 S. Ct. 55
(1944).
51
62 N.L.R.B. 683 (1945), 16 LAB. REL. REP. 652 (1945).
52
'
42 N.L.R.B. 866 (1942), enforced in NLRB v. John Engelhorn & Sons,
(C.C.A. 3d, 1943) 134 F. (2d) 553.
58
Sec~ 8 provides, in part, that it is unfair labor practice for an employer "1. To
interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
in section 7."
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also found, however, that the employer had unlawfully assisted the
A.F. of L. union prior to the execution of'the agreement through the
medium of statements by supervisors to employees indicating the employer's preference for the A.F. of L. as bargaining agent. The board
found that a contract made under these circumstances was subject to
the board's determination in the repr~entation proceeding and set it
aside.
The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit enforced the
board's order but specifically left open the question as to whether the
execution of the agreement in the face of a prevailing representation
petition constituted an independent violation of the act. The boatd's
order and finding of violation of section 8 (I) could be sustained, of
course, on the basis of the violations of section 8 (I) presented by the
supervisors' statements in favor of the A.F. of L. The finding that the
execution of a contract with a union previously certified by the board
in the face of a petition for certification filed by a rival union is in itself
an unfair labor practice seems a doubtful result.
The board has said that a neutral employer, upon being confronted
with conflicting representation claims by two rival unions, "would not
negotiate a contract with one of them until its right to be recognized
as the collective bargaining representative had been finally determined
under the procedures set up under the Act." 54 That statement, however, appears to be too broad. Where there has been no contractual
relationship with either of two unions and the employer in the face of
an assertion of majority status by each chooses to execute a contract
with one of these unions he clearly indicates to the employees his preference. Where, howeve~, the employer has had contractual relations
with a union which possesses a board certification it is a fair inference
that he is following an apparently appropriate course of action in dealing with a union which still holds the statutory indicia of majority
status. The mere filing of a petition by a rival labor organization
should not, under these circumstances, operate to divest the certification of all effect. A contrary ruling affords the petitioning union a very
real advantage in any struggle for employee favor.
The petitioner can make capital by using campaign propaganda
pointing to i~s rival's inability to obtain a contract from the employer.
In addition, the board's holding encourages the filing of frivolous pe54
Matter of Elastic Stop Nut Corporation, 51 N.L.R.B. 694 at 702 (1944),
cited supra, note 50; but cf: Matter of Gulf States Utilities Company, 42 N.L.R.B.
988 (1942).
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titions and consequently promotes instability. It would appear to be
sufficient to regard the contract as defeasible if the board dire.cts an election and the petitioning union is certified as the winner 6f such an
election/ 5
In the Elastic Stop Nut Corpora~ion case, where there was no previous bargaining history with either of two rival unions each of which
was attempting to organize the company's employees, the employer's
execution of a contract with one of the two unions was held by the board
to constitute a violation of section 8 (I) of the act.
In the Keystone Steel and Wire case, the board found that the
execution of a contract with an illegal successor to a company-dominated
union in the face of a claim of majority representation by another union
was violative of the act. In this case, the contracting union was .an unlawful organizati-on and the contract was illegal in any event since made
with an. assisted labor organization.56
In none of these cases were the contracts held--invalid by the board
limited in duration to the determination of a representation proceeding.
These contracts were, in fact, for either a one-y~ar period or of indefinite duration.
It is accepted practice for the parties to a collective agreement to
extend the terms of the expired agreement pending the outcome of negotiations. The National War Labor Board in numerous cases has
issued interim orders extending th~ terms of the expiring agreements
between the parties pending the' resolution of the dispute before the
board. The National War Labor Board has followed this practice in
cases in which representation proceedings were pending before the
NLRB. In such cases, the War Lab9r Board normally has made its
interim order subject to the outcome of the NLRB proceeding.57
The National War Labor Board has pointed out that the making
55
56

Cf.. Matter of Walgreen Company, 44 N.L.R.B. 1200 (1942).

NLRB v. Electric Vacuum Cleaner Co., Inc., 315 U.S. 685, 62 S. Ct. 846
(1942) ;,NLRB v. Premo Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Inc., {C.C.A. 2d, 1943) 136
F. (2d) 85; Louis F. Cassoff doing business as Central Paint and Varnish Works, 43
N.L.R.B. II93 (1942), enforced in NLRB v. Louis F. Cassoff doing business as
Central Paint and Varnish Works, (C.C.A. 2d, 1943) 139 F. (2d) 397; Matter of
Eagle-Picher Mining & Smelting Co., 16 N.L.R.B. 727 (1939) enforced, as modified,
in Eagle-Picher Mining & Smelting Co. v. NLRB, (C.C.A. 8th, 1941) u9 F. (2d)
903.
57
In re Montgomery Ward & Co., 13 WAR LAB. REP. 454 (1944); United
States Automatic Transp. Co., Case No. 2570-CSD (Dec. 14, 1944) (unreported);
Western Union Telegraph Co., 13 WAR .LAB. REP. 297 (1943); Lamson & Sessions
Co., 8 WAR LAB. REP. 295 (1943).
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of extension agreements contributes to the maintenanc~ of industrial
peace. In the National Carbon Co. case, Public Member, later Chairman, Taylor speaking for the board said:
"It has become increasingly evident that lack of contractual relationship between employers and employees defining wages, hours,
and working conditions in the interim pending the ,completion of
a new contract, creates a feeling of uncertainty on the part of employees which adversely affects production and harmonious rela... tions within the plant. Experience has demonstrated, furthermore,
that this uncei;tainty reflects itself in the atmosphere of collective
bargaining and lessens .the chances for a peaceful and speedy disposition of issues in dispute. For these reasons, the Board believes
that as a general rule the status quo at the expiration date of a
collective bargaining agreement should be maintained pending
the completion of a new agreement of final settlement of any issues
in dispute. This policy reflects the consistent attitude of governmental authorities in similar situations and is identical with the
procedure voluntarily adopted by many employers as a means of
maintaining stable and harmonious relations with responsible
unions which represent their employees in collective bargaining.
· By following this policy the Board does not prejudge coµtests
over spch matters as majority status or union responsibility but
merely postpones final argq,ment and decision thereon until after
the case has been fully argued on the merits before a panel or
other instrumentaJity of the Board. The policy of the Board, as
thus outlined, corresponds with the traditional practice of our
courts to maintain the status quo of the subject matter in dispute
pending a final determination of the case on its merits." 58
It ha~ become increasingly clear that the establishment of a collective bargaining relationship results in the institution of a form of industrial government for the particular industrial community. That the
act was intended to· promote industrial peace by the establishmeIJ.t of
indusq-ial democracy cannot be doubted. 59 With reference to each
. industrial community, the collective agreement becomes the basic law,
58

National Carbon Co., 14 WAR LAB. REP. 21 at 21-22 (1944).
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated, "The establishment of such
industrial democracy is the avowed purpose of the National Labor Relatfons Act, which
declares it to be in the public interest because of its tendency to preserve industrial
peace and prevent interference with interstate commerce." NLRB v. Standard Lime
& Stone Co., (C.C.A. 4th, 1945) 149 F. (2d) 435 at 438, cert. denied, 326 U.S.
723, 66 S. Ct. 28 (1945).
59

'
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the constitution by which the community is governed.60 The Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has said, "The purpose of the
written trade agreement is,- not primarily to reduce to writing settlements of past differences, but to provide a statement of principles and
rules for the orderly government of the employer-employee relation'ship in the future .... it provides a framework within which the process
of collective bargaining may be carried on." 61 The Supreme Court
has had occasion to point out the effective contribution to industrial
stability resulting from the existence of a written trade agreement.62
The National Labor Relations Board likewise has recognized the importance of stability in industrial government. Considerations of the
desirability of promoting stability have led the board to refuse to entertain a representation petition where the petitioning union's claim for
recogn:ition was asserted after an automatic renewal clause in a collective agreement with a rival union had become operative, even though
the claim was made prior to the anniversary date of an agreement
which had already been in effect for substantially a one-year period.68
As indicated elsewhere in this article,64 the board has developed a
doctrine of administrative stability in accordance with which it normally has refused to consider a certification of less than one year's
duration as inoperative despite an uncoerced loss of majorit'Y by the
certified union.
60
"The trade• agreement ••. is a written constitution of a new type of government, an industrial government, established by bargaining as an organized group .••
The industrial government envisaged by unionism was a highly integrated government
of unionized workers and of associated employer-managers, jointly conducting the government with 'laws' mandatory upon the individual employer and employee." PER_LMAN AND TAFT, HISTORY OF LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES, 1896-1932, p. IO
(1935); "The collective agreements are in effect industrial constitutions and laws
adopted by carriers and their employees for the government of their joint relations••••"
THE RAILWAY LABOR AcT AND THE NATIONAL MEDIATION BoARD 43, (1940).
61
NLRB v. Highland Park Mfg. Co., (C.C.A. 4th, 1940) 110 F. (2d) 632 at
638.
'
62
H.J. Heinz Co. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 514 61 S. Ct. 320 (1941). The National Mediation Board has commented that: "The absence of strikes on the railroads
and air lines is to be explained primarily not so much by the mediation machinery of
the Railway Labor Act, as by' the existence of these collective labor agreements, for,
while they are in existence, these contracts· provide orderly, legal processes of settling
all labor disputes as a substitute for strikes and industrial warfare. • • ." THE RAILWAY LABOR AcT AND THE NATIONAL MEDIATION BoARD 43 (1940).
·
63
Matter of Mill B., Inc., 40 N.L.R.B. 346 (1942). The board pointed out
that the prevention of- a hiatus between contracts tended to promote industrial stabil-

ity.
64

Supra, part I.
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The average lapse of time between a direction of election and the
issuance of a certification is approximately thirty days. The board's
concept of a thirty day period of industrial anarchy seems inconsistent
with the doctrine advanced in Matter of Tarbardrey Manufacturing
Company.65 There the board's refusal to entertain a petition by a substantial number of employees requesting that the existing statutory
representative be decertified appears to have been predicated on the
notion that the act was intended to favor the growth of collective bargaining. 66 If that viewpoint is sound, the adoption of a practice which
results in the absence of collective bargaining, even for a limited period,
is at odds, not only with the history and purpose of the act, but also
with sound industrial relations practice.
The upshot of the board's ruling in the Phelps-Dodge case is to
make for a _period of industrial anarchy. For approximately thirty
days the industrial community is without its basic law. Thirty days
is a substantial period in the life of an industrial establishment. In the
light of the history of· the act, and the extensive application of the
concept of administrative stability in cases involving automatic renewal
contracts and in other situations, the creation of a hiatus in industrial
relations of such extent seems doubtful practice.
Moreover, it is the usual practice of the NLRB to direct an election on a prima facie showing by a petitioning union of designation as
65

51 N.L.R.B. 246 (1943), cited supra, note 22.
At a hearing before the Smith Committee, so-called, Chairman Howard Smith
interrogated Board Memb.er Gerard D. Reilly with reference to the basis for the board's
holding in the Tabardrey case. The following colloquy took place:
"The Chairman: While you are on that, why could not the employees petition
for election when they did not want a union, to have no union? If they could
petition to have a union, why not petition not to have a union?
"Mr. Reilly: The theory of the decision was the petition had to be a petition
for a representative.
"Mr. Voorhis: I suppose that is the theory of the National Labor Relations Act,
as a matter of fact, is it not?
"Mr. Reilly: Yes."
Hearings before the Special Committee to investigate Executive Agencies on the
War Labor Board, 79th Cong., 1st sess., p. 1212 (1945).
Section 1, the preamble of the act, provides in part that: "It is hereby declared
to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of certain substantial
obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective
bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association,
self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the
purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual
aid or protection."
66
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bargaining agent by 30 per cent or more of the employees composing
the bargaining unit. The petitioning union may, and frequently does,
lose in the subsequent election.67 The board apparently regards acer1
tification as impliedly revoked when a direction of election is issued.
That doctrine seems -qnrealistic, however, for the previously certified
union may well retain its majority status. A 30 per cent showing is, in
fact, a minority showing. The ordinary rule of law is that a-state of
things once found to exist is presumed to continue. In the railroad
industry which is subject to the provisions of the Railway Labor Act,68
the parties operate under the contract with the contracting union
, throughout the pre-election period. The National Mediation Board
has held that if-the rival union wins the election it must assume the
existing contract.69 · To hold that the certified union's majority may be
presumed to have been lost on a showing by a rival union that it is now
a minority unio,n is illogical.
On the other hand, it might be contended that the board's holding
that a direction of election impliedly i:evokes a previous certification
insures attainment of the statutory goal of freedom of choice of a representative. In support of this view, it might be said that the act of
an.employer in continuing to deal with the contracting union may fairly
be regarded as indicating to the employees the employer's preference
for dealing with the, contracting union.
This concept may properly be regarded as unrealistic. Where
there has been no bargaining history and the employer chooses to deal
with one of two or more rival. :labor organizations, the inference is
clear as to the employer's wishes. Where, however, an employer has
contracted with a union certified by the board and merely extends the
contract pending the outcome of an election, the inference, as in the
case of contracts· executed after the filing of a petition, is at least as
strong to the effect that the employer is pursuing a normal course of
67

An unpublished study by the board's staff indicates that in elections ordered
for the fiscal years 1941 and 1942 in cases involving two unions and where the petitioner's rival was a party to a previously executed contract, the petitioner won 72 per
cent of the elections ordered in non-closed shop cases and 46 per cent in closed shop
cases.
68
44 Stat. L. 577 (1926), 45 U.S.C. (1940) § r51, as amended, 48 Stat. L.
II85 at II86 (1934), 45 U.S.C. (1940) § 151 (a).
69
THE RAILWAY LABoR AcT AND THE NATIONAL MEDIATION BoARD 19 (1940).
The National Mediation Board requires a minimum showing of designation by at
least 50 per cent of the potential voting eligibles. TENTH ANNUAL REPORT oF THE
NATIONAL MEDIATION BOARD 6 (1945). .
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action in dealing with an organization which still wears the trappings
of office in the form of a board certification.
The advantage accruing to the "in-union" under these circumstances is slight. In political elections it is generally thought that the
administration has an advantage in attracting the support of the voter
accruing from the fact of its incumbency. The governmental analogy
has been applied to the administration of a trade agreement. It seems
clear that the desirability• of preserving stability in the administration
of labor relati01;1s at a particular plant or establishment during the
heated pre-election period outweighs the desirability of insulating the
employees against conduct having a doubtful tendency to influence them
in the choice of their bargaining representative during the pre-election
period. And it may be doubted that employees are more likely to be
influenced in the selection of a bargaining agency by this temporary
extension of a collective bargaining relationship than is the case in the
retention of a particular individual in office pending the selection of a
government official in political elections.
If, however, the employer rilakes -an entirely new contract with
the certified organization containing more favorable terms and conditions of employment than were contained in the expired agreement, the
employer's conduct is susceptible of an inference that he is intending to
impress the employees with the efficacy of the contracting union as a
bargaining agent. Such conduct may properly be ,condemned as antithetical to obligations of neutrality imposed by the pendency of an
NLRB election. 7°
Once the board has directed an election, the problem as to the extension of the expired contract for a period extending beyond the date
of determination of the pending representation question is not free
from difficulty. Such conduct may be said to extend beyond the area of
action indicating solely a desire for the preservation of continuity and
stability in industrial relations pending a determination of employee
choice of representatives. In such situations, the employer, by extending the contract for a full year or indefinitely, evidences a continuing
preference for the contracting union as bargaining agent. Under those
circumstances, the employer's conduct may properly be held violative
~~~

.

B. The Effect of a Direction of Election upon Grievance Repre10 Cf. NLRB v. Sunbeam Electric Mfg. Co., (C.C.A. 7th, 1943) 133 F. (2d)
856; Matter of Joseph L. Fradkin and Ben Singer, Co-Partners Trading as American
Linen Service Company, 45 N.L.R.B. 902 at 908 (1942).
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sentation. It seems clear from the board's decision in the Phelps-Dodge
case that, for the period during which a board d~rected election is pending, an employer must, with reference to grievances, deal with each ,
of the rival unions as the representative of its adherents, or deal with
neither. Assuming, however, that the board's holdings concerning the
effect of the extension of collective bargaining agreements during the
pending of representation proceedings are correct, the question as to the
propriety of exclusive grievance representation by the certified union
during the pre-election period must, nevertheless, be considered.
The importance of an efficiently functioning grievance machinery
to good labor relations has often been recognized. 71 Strikes frequently
are motivated by the dilatory handling of grievances by ,employers. 7 2
It is often the function of the grievance procedure to resolve disputes concerning the application and interpretation of a collective bargaip.ing agreement. In industries where the provisions of the agreement are customarily comprehensive and detailed, the most important
use of the grievance procedure is its value as a technique for interpretation of the agreement. 73 In such industries the grievance procedure
71
SETTLING PLANT GRIEVANCES, U.S. Dept. of Labor, Division of Labor Standards, Bull. No. 60, p. l (1943); Freidin and Ulman, "Arbitration and the National
War Labor Board," 58 HARV. L. REv. 309 at 312 (1945); LAPP, How To HANDLE
LABoR GRIEVANCES II, 12 (1945). Congress gave statutory recognition to the importance of the disposition of grievances to industrial peace in the Railway Labor Act. One
of the purposes of the act was stated as "the prompt and orderly settlement of all
disputes growing out of grievances."
72
With reference to the effect of delay in the settlement of disputes -involving
grievances, the House Report on the r934 amendments to the Railway Labor Act
stated: "Many thousands of these disputes have been considered by boards established
under the Railway Labor Act; but the boards have been unable to reach a majority
'decision, and so the proceedings- have been deadlocked. These unadjusted disputes
have become so numerous that on several occasions the employees have resorted to the
issuance of strike ballots and threatened to interrupt interstate commerce in order to
secure an adjustment. This has made it necessary for the President of the United
States to intervene and establish an emergency board to investigate the controversies.
This condition should be corrected in the interest of industrial peace and of uninterrupted transportation service. This bill, therefore, provides for the establishment of a
national board of adjustment to which these disputes may be submitted if they shall
not have been adjusted in conference between the parties." H. Rep. 1944, 73d Cong.,
2d sess., p. 3 (1934). Cf. also the testimony of Coordinator Eastman, Hearings before
Committee on Inter-state Commerce on H.R. 7650, 73rd Cong., 2d sess., 49 (1934).
73
NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332 at 342, 59 S. Ct. 508 (1939);
NLRB v. Newark Morning Ledger Co., (C.C.A. 3d, 1941) 120 F. (2d) 262 at
267, cert. denied, 314 U.S. 693, 62 S. Ct. 363 (1941); Matter of George Carroll
doing business as Carroll's Tra'hsfer Co., 56 N.L.R.B. 935 (1944). That the interpretation and application of a collective bargaining agreement is an indispensable phase of the
collective bargaining process is clear.
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represents the judicial process in the industrial community. In other
industries agreements merely deal with the general aspects of the relationship between the parties and the specific aspects are determined by
continuous collective bargaining through the mechanics of the grievance procedure. In either case, the disposition of a particular grievance
frequently serves as a precedent and weaves the pattern for the settlement of similar grievances. 74
If two competing unions are to be allowed to present and dispose
of grievances during the pre-election period, an incentive is presynted
to each organization to press vigorously every grievance, no matter
how trivial or lacking in merit, in an attempt to obtain a competitive
advantage by using the settlement of frivolous grievances as a means
of establishing its prowess as bargaining agent. Undoubtedly, grievances which ordinarily would not be pressed beyond the first step of
the grievance procedure would be exaggerated far beyond their importance. The settlement of grievances, ordinarily a method for the
elimination of employee unrest, might well provide the soil for the
growth of employee friction and dissatisfaction.
Moreover, the precedent setting function of the grievance procedure may be disturbed. The petitioning union and the employer may
settle grievances arising under the terms of the agreement with' the
certified union in a fashion inconsistent either with previous precedent
or with the intent of the parties to the agreement. 75 As the Supreme
Court stated in Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway Express
Agency, Inc., deviations from the standard set by the contracting union
"introduce competitions and discriminations that are upsetting to the
entire structure." 76
•
Finally, the dual grievance procedure sanctioned by the PhelpsDodge decision appears to overlook the historical foundation of the
act. The controversy over the interpretation of section 7 (a) of the
National Industrial Recovery Act issued by Mr. Richberg and General
74

"Many of the cases handled through grievance procedure may involve similar
questions. Such similar cases may frequently be settled more speedly by reference to
previous decisions. Often the steward and foreman will be able to agree on settlements
in line with precedents already established. These precedents .•. may develop over
a period of years into a body of industrial common law supplementing the basic
contract." SE'ITLING PLANT GRIEVANCES, U.S. Dept. of Labor, Division of Labor
Standards, Bull. No. 60, pp. 37-38 (1943).
75
For example, an employee may ask the rival union to process a grievance as to
the rate of pay due him under the terms of the agreement with the certified union.
76
321 U.S. 342 at 346, 64 S. Ct. 582 (1944).
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Johnson is one of the most vivid in recent labor 't'elations history.7 7
That interpretation permitted proportional representation by labor organizations and encountered the violent opposition of organized labor.
The National Labor Board and the first National Labor Relations
Board adopted the theory of majority rule 78 and the legislative history
of the NLRA makes it abundantly clear that the proponents of the
act and the Congress considered plural representation inconsistent with
sound labor relations practices. The Senate Report said in part:
"The object of collective bargaining is the making of agreements
that will stabilize business conditions and fix fair standards of
working conditions. Since it is well-nigh universally recognized
that it is practically impossible to apply two or more sets of agreements to one unit of workers at the sa~e time, cir to apply the
terms of one agreement to only a portion of the workers in a
single unit, the making of agreements is impracticable in the absence of majority rule. And by long experience, majority rule has
been discovered best for employers as well as employees. Workers have found it impossible to approach their employers in a
- friendly spirit if they remained divided among themselves. Em, players likewise, where 1majority rule has been given a trial of reasonable duration, have found it more. conducive to harmonious
labor relations to negotiate with representatives chosen by the majority than with numerous warring factions." 79
The House Report read in part:
" ... There cannot be two or more basic agreements applicable
to workers in a given unit; this is virtually conceded on all sides.
If the employer should fail to give equally advantageous terms
to non-members of the labor organization negotiating the agreement, there would immediately result a marked increase in the
- membership of the labor organization. On the other hand, if better terms were given to non-members, this would give rise to bitterness and strife, and a wholly unworkable arrangement whereby
men performing comparable duties were paid according to different scales of wages and hours. Clearly then, there must be one
basic scale, and it must apply to all.
"· .. If, however, the company should undertake to deal with
77 For an account of this controversy see LoRWIN AND WUBNIG, LABOR RELATIONS
BoARDs 192-193, 269-271; 373, 396, 397, 313-314, 337, 356, 426 (1935), and
BowMAN, PUBLIC CoNTROL OF LABOR RELATIONS 32-38 (1942).
78 Matter of Denver Tramway, Corp., I N.L.B. 64 (1934); Matter of Houde
Engineering Corporation, I N.L.R.B. (old) 35 (1934).
79
S. Rep. 573, 74th Cong., 1st sess, p. 13 (1935).
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each group separately, there would result the conditions pbinted
out by the present National Labor Relations Board in its decision
in the Matter of Houde Engineering Corporation [I N.L.R.B. 35
(A,ug. 30, 1934)]:
"'It seems clear that the company's policy of dealing first with
one group and then with the other resulted, whether intentionally
or not, in defeating the object of the statute. In the first place,
the company's policy inevitably produced a certain amount of rivalry, suspicion, and friction between the leaders of the [ twentyone] committees .... Secondly, the company's policy, by enabling
it to favor one organization at the expense of the other, and thus
to check at will the growth of either organization, was calculated
to confuse the employees, to make them uncertain which organization they should from time to time adhere to, and to maintain
a permanent and artificial division in the ranks.' " 80
Those statements embody the content of testimony of authorities
favoring the enactment of the proposed statute. 81
While these statements relate to situations in which a majority representative is admittedly in existence, their rationale has ·equal force
even during the period subsequent to a direction of election between
a certified union and a rival organization. Confusion, unrest, and instability are intensified in such a milieu by a division of representative
authority. The wisdom of the board's requirement of the maintenance
of a dual grievance procedure or a complete hiatus in bargaining relationships as expressed in the Phelps-Dodge case is ,open to question.
There is no compulsion under the law and little justification in theory
for a result so at variance with e4})erience. That, for the interim
period between a direction of election and the designation of a representative, the certified union should be permitted to act as the exclusive
representative of all employees in the appropriate unit insofar as grievances are concerned is the result indicated bpth by history and sound
practice.
C. Extension of Contracts Containing Union Security Provisions.
The extension of union security provisions subsequent to a direction of
election by NLRB is subject to somewhat different considerations from
H. Rep. 1147, 74th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 20, 21 (1935).
Hearings before Committee on Education and L,tbor on S. 1958, 74th Cong.,
1st sess., pp. 43-46, 81-83, 118-120, 127-128, 181-182 (1935); Hearings before
Committee on Labor on H.R. 6288, 74th Cong., 1st sess.,_pp. 17-18, 204-206, 278279 (1935).
so

81
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those presented by the extension of contracts devoid of such provisions.
The proviso to section 8 (3) of the National Labor Relations Act reads
as follows:
"By discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment
or any term or condition of· employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization: Provided, That
nothing in this act, or in the Natio~al Industrial Recovery Act
(U.S.C., Supp. VII,-title 15, secs. 701-712), as amended from
time to time, or in any code or agreemept approved or prescribed
thereunder, or in any other statute of the United States, shall preclude an employer from making an agreement with a labor organization ( not established, maintained, or assisted by an action defined
in this Act as an unfair labor practice) to require as a condition of
employment membership therein, if such labor organization is the
representative of the employees as provided in section 9 (a), in
the appropriate collective bargaining unit cov~red by such agreement when made."
It is of course familiar law that provisos limiting the scope of
remedial legislation ought to be strictly construed.82 The Senate Report
makes the following comment as to the intent of the proviso:
"The assertion that the bill favots the closed shop is particularly
misleading in view of the fact that the proviso in two respects actually narrows the now existent law regarding closed-shop agreements. While today an employer may negotiate such an agreement
even with a minority union, the bill provides that an employer
shall be allowed to make a closed-shop contract only with a labor
organization that represents the majority of employees in the appropriate collective bargaining unit covered by such agreement
when made.
"Secondly, the bill is extremely careful to forestall the making
of closed-shop agreements with organizations that have been 'established, maintained, or assisted' by any action defined in the bill
as an unfair labor practice. And of course it is clear that no agreement heretofore made could give validity to the practices herein
prohibited by section 8." 88
. The emphasis of the proviso is upon the requirement of majority
82 Cf. Thompson v. United States, (C.C.A. 8th, 1919) 258 F. 196, cert. denied,
251 U.S. 553, 40 S. Ct. 57 (1919); Fleming v. Hawkeye Pearl Button Co., (C.C.A.
Sth,-1940) 113 F. (2d) 52.
83
S. Rep. 573, 74th Cong., 1s5 sess., p. 12 (1935).
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status at the time of execution. The statute distinguishes, therefore,
between union security agreements and collective agreements devoid
of such provisions. While the doctrine of administrative stability may
insulate an ordinary collective agreement made relatively soon after
certification from the requirement of actual majority status at the time of
execution of the contract, the area of protection of union security agreements is narrowly circumscribed. Each such agreement must meet the test
of majority status at the date of execution. Moreover, the holding in
Wallace Corporation v. NLRB 84 points to situations in which the e:x;tension of union security provisions of a contract may constitute an
unfair labor practice.
The board in a series of cases has indicated the narrow confines of
statutory protection of union security clauses. In Matter of Rutland
Court Owners, Inc., 85 it appeared that an A.F. of L. union, while certified as the bargaining representative of the employees, entered into a
closed-shop contract which was renewable annually if proper notice was
given. Near the termination -of the contract all of the employees decided to switch to a C.I.O. union. The A.F. of L. union thereupon
directeq. the company to discharge the entire working force. The company acceded to this request and supplied an entirely new crew of
A.F. of.L. men. On charges initiated by the C.I.O. union, the National
Labor Relations Board held that the company had violated section
8(3) of the act, and that the discharges were not justified by the
closed-shop agreement. In explaining its decision, the board said:
"We did not hold that employees were free to withdraw from a
union having a closed shop agreement a month or 6 weeks before
the agreement expired. We did hold that employees who attempt
to retain their membership in the contracting union during the life
of the contract may not be foreclosed from doing so for the purpose of justifying their discharge under the contract merely because they have designated a new representative for future bargaining. To hold otherwise would mean that an employer and a
union official, acting in concert, could maintain one labor organization in perpetuity as the bargaining representative by the simple
device of expelling any employees who wished to have a different
84

323 U.S. 248, 65 S. Ct. 238 (1944). The Wallace case is discussed elsewhere
in this article in connection with problems arising from the practice of racial discrimination by unions infra, part IV.
85
44 N.L.R.B. 587 (1942), 46 N.L.R.B. 1040 (1943).
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representative when the question of the renewal of the contract
arose.

.

.

.

.

.

.

"The express purpose of the Act is to insure employees of their
-own right of self-organization and a free choice of representatives.
We cannot allow the declared intention of Congress to be evaded
by permitting an employer and a union thus to combine to preclude the employees from expressing their choice. The proviso in
Section 8 (3) cannot therefore be considered as an instrument for
depriving employees of their statutory right to select another representative for a period succeeding the terr~ embraced by the
closed-shop contract. We recognize the force of the arguments in
favor of stability, but as we indicated previously the stability intended by the Act is not that involved in perennial suppression of
the employees' will." 86
In the Wallace case the board found that the employer violated
the act by entering into a dosed-shop contract with a certified union,
knowing that the union intended to invoke the ~ontract not only for,
the purpose of requiring the employees to join -the union bu:t also to
secure ~he discharge of employees for prior activity in behalf of a rival
umon.
That the right of an: employer and a majority representative to
enter into or apply a union security contract under the proviso to section 8 (3) may not be exercised in a manner which prevents the free
exercise of the right to select a bargaining representative is clear. This
is especially true during the critical pre-election period. The doctrine
of administrative stability cannot be utilized to prohibit the untrammeled selection of a statutory representative.87 To this extent the diGtum in the Phelps-Dodge case seems sound.
86

'

46 N.L.R.B. 1040 at 1041-1042 (1943). In Matter of Garod Radio Corp.;
47 N.L.R.B. 677 (1943), the NLRB held that a closed-shop agreement with an
A.F_. of L. union was invalid "because it was made at a time when a question as to
representation was pending before the Board, and because the results of the Board's
statutory investigation, the exclusive means then available for the determination of the
question, did not disclose that •.. [the A.F. of L. union] had been designated by
the majority of the employees in an appropriate unit, as required by the proviso to
Section 8 (3) of the Act." (Id. at 678.) In that case, the closed-shop agreement was
entered into after the holding of an NLRB election won by a rival C.I.O. union but
· prior to the issuance of certification.
87 The National War Labor Board appe,ars to have been somewhat insensitive to
these considerations. In several cases NWLB has extended contracts containing union
security provisions during the pendency of NLRB representation proceedings. While
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IV
REVOCATION OF CERTIFICATIONS

The NLRB has recent!y indicated that it will revoke or m.odify certifications under certain circumstances.88 In a series of cases in which
allegations were made that a c;ertifi.ed or petitioning union would not
or did not afford non-discriminatory representation to negro employees
embraced within an appropriate unit, the board stated that it would
rescind a certification upon a showing that equal representation had
been denied to any employees included in the certified bargaining unit. 89
While admitting its lack of express statutory authority to eliminate
undemocratic union practices, the board has said that it "conceived it
to be our duty under the statute to see to it that any organization certified under section 9 ( c) as the bargaining representative acted as a genuine representative of all the employees in the bargaining unit." 00
It is doubtful that the act was intended to do more than prohibit
anti-union activities by employers. The board has recognized that its
powers to determine the appropriateness of bargaining units and the
the extension was made subject to the outcome of such proceedings, no qualification
was imposed on the effectiveness of the union securio/ phases of the contracts. National
Carbon Co., 13 WAR LAB. REP. 236 (1943), 14 WAR LAB. REP. 21 (1944); Montgomery Ward & Co., 13 WAR. LAB. REP. 454 (1944). (Union security award contingent upon success of union in pending NLRB proceedings.) Contra: Interstate S.S.
Co., 14 WAR LAB. REP. 652 (1944). In the Potlatch Forests case, 14 WAR LAB.
REP. 6 (1944), the extension of a maintenance of membership provision was defined
by the board as subject to arl obligation on the part of the contracting union to administer its affairs "in such a way as not to create mass discharge problems interfering with
the war effort."
88 Until recently, except where an employer was faced with conflicting representation claiins of rival unions, the board consistently refused to allow employers to petition for the holding of elections. Recently, however, the board has alJowed employers
to petition for decertification of a union. Matter of Marshall, Meadows & Stewart,
Inc., 63 N.L.R.B. 233 (1945) (petition dismissed where six months after certifi.catian
infomal petition to employer indicated loss of union's majority); Matter of Wentworth
Bus Lines, Inc., 64 N.L.R.B. 65, 17 LAB. REL. REP. 228 (1945). (Motion to
withdraw certification denied on basis of presence of unfair labor practices leading to
loss of majority as well as on application of Allis-Chalmers doctrine.)
89
Matter of Larus and Brother Company, Inc., 62 N.L.R.B. 1075 (1945);
Matter of Atlanta Oak Flooring Company, 62 N.L.R.B. 973 (1945); Matter of
General Motors Corporation (Chevrolet Shell Division), 62 N.L.R.B. 427 (1945);
Matter of Southwestern Portland Cement Company, 61 N.L.R.B. 1217 (1945);
Matter of Carter Manufacturing Company, 5-9 N.L.R.B. 804 .(1944); Matter of
Bethlehem-,Alameda Shipyard, Inc., 53 N.L.R.B. 999 (1943).
9
~ Matter of Larus and Brother Company, Inc., 62 N.L.R.B. 1075 (1945).
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statutory representative of the employees in such units are ancillary to
the fundamental aim of the protection of the right of employees to
organize. In its First Annual Report, the board said:
" ... For an employer to refuse to bargain collectively with
such representatives is, by virtue of section ,8, subdivision ( 5), an
unfair labor practice which the Board is empowered to prevent.
Whether or not a majority of the employees in an appropriate unit
desire the same organization to represent them ·is a fact which
must be determined before it can be found that an employer has
committed an unfair labor practice in refusing to bargain collectively. The purpose of section 9(c) is to give the Board the necessary investigatory power to determine this fact." 91

.

The board has relied on several recent Supreme Court decisions
as the foundation for its power to withhold or revoke certifications in
situations involving discrimination by certified labor unions in the representation of employees on the basis of race, color, creed, or religion.
In Wallace Corporation v. NLRB,9 2 a majority of the Court upheld
an NLRB order :which requfred the reinstatement of several employees
who had been discharged under a union shop contract pursuant to the
request of the contracting union, where admission to the union had
been denied these employees because of prior union activity on behalf
of a rival organization and where the employer had knowledge prior
to the time he signed the agreement of the union's intention to request •
91
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, FIRST ANNUAL REPORT 103 (1936).
Accord: NATioill~L LABOR RELATIONS BoARD, FouRTH ANNUAL REPORT 73 ( 1940) ;
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BoARD, SixTH ANNUAL REPORT 54 (1942). In refusing
under Section 9(c) to determine a jurisdictional dispute the board, in Matter of
Aluminum Company of America, I N.L.R.B. 530 (1936), said at 537: "It is preferable
that the Board should not interfere with the internal affairs of labor organizations.
Self-organization of employees implies a policy of self-management. The role that
organizations of employees eventually must play in the structure established by Congress
through that Act is a large and vital one. They will best be able to perform that role
if they are permitted freely to work out the solutions to their own internal problems.
In its permanent operation the Act envisages cohesive organizations,, well-constructed
and intelligently guided. Such organizations will not develop if they are led to look
elsewhere for the solutions to such problems. In fine, the policy of the National Labor
Relations Act is to encourage the procedure of collective bargaining and to protect
employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed to them from the denial and inter~
ference of employers. That policy can best be advanced by the Board's devoting its
attention to controversies that concern such fundamental matters. The petition for
certification is accordingly dismissed."
92
323 U.S. 248, 65 S. Ct. 238 (1944).
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the discharge of these employees.93 In Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. 9 anci the compaQion case of Tunstall v. Brotherhood of
Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen,95 the Court held that a labor
organization has a statutory duty as bargaining agent not to discriminate on the basis of race in the making of agreements against any group
it purports to represent. The Court held that the exercise of such
discrimination gives rise, in the absence of any administrative remedy,
to the normal judicial remedies of the injunction and damages. 96
None of these cases held that the power to certify labor organizations as a majority representative supports a denial or revocation of a
certification on the basis of a potential or actual failure to fulfill a duty
of non-discriminatory exercise of statutory bargaining powers. In the
Wallace case, Justice Jackson, speaking for the four dissenting justices,
suggested, without deciding, that the board might possibly have such
power.97 On the other hand, the history of the statute reveals no support for such a position. One may agree that the right to represent all
of th~ employees in the bargaining unit carries· with it a correlative
duty to represent all fairly and impartially. It does not necessarily fol4,

93

The board considered irrelevant the obligation of the employer under the
terms of a pre-election agreement entered into with the competing unions to grant a
union shop to whichever union was successful i1_1 the election.
9
4. 323 U.S. 192, 65 S. Ct. 226 (1944).
95
323 U.S. 210, 65 S. Ct. 235 (1944).
96
In the Steele case the court overruled a demurrer to a petition which sought an
injunction against the enforcement of a collective agreement restricting the employment and seniority rights of Negro firemen, an injunction against the continued representation of the petitioner and other Negroes by the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, a declaratory judgment, and an award of damages against the
Brotherhood.
97
Justice Jackson preceded this suggestion, however, by the following observation,
323 U.S. 248 at 268: ''Neither the National Labor Relations Act nor any other Act
of Congress explicitly or by implication gives to the Board any power to supervise union
membership or to deal with union practices, however unfair they may be to members,
to applicants, to minorities, to other unions, or to employers. This may or may not
have been a mistake but it was no oversight."
The Wallace, Steele and Tunstall cases are discussed in an excellent note in 58
HARV. L. REv. 448 (1945). The view is expressed that the union's duty to represent all members of the bargaining unit is constitutionally imposed. The decision
in Marinship Corp. v. James, (Cal. 1945) 15 LAB. REL. REP. 627, is noted with approval. In that case the discharge of a Negro employee who had been denied admission
to a union on equal terms with white employees was requested by the union pursuant ,
to a closed-shop contract. The California Supreme Court held that t!Je union should
be ordered either to admit negro employees without discrimination or to refrain from
enforcing the closed-shop provisions of the contract against them.
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low that Congress intended that the board should be the agency to
enforce the obligations flowing from the implied statutory duty of
equal representation. The enforcement machinery of the NLRB is
directea. against the employer only.98 It would seem more appropriate
to consider violations of a duty imposed -on a union as statutory bargaining agent as remediable in the courts on the initiation of proceedings by aggrieved employees.
Section 9 ( c) of the NLRA is modeled upon a corresponding provisi<;>n of the Railway Labor Act. 00 The court in the Steele and Tunstall
cases, supra, noted that the Railway Act provided no administrative
remedy for the type of discrimination alleged in those cases. Nothing
iri the NLRA ~ppears to support a distinction in this respect between the
two statutes. The NLRB's remedial powers are found in section 1,o(c)
of the statute which gives the board broad authority to prevent the
commission of up.fair labor practices by the issuance of cease and desist
orders,and by 'the taking of such affirmative action as will "effectuate
the purposes of the Acf." Section 9 ( c) gives the board the power to
certify representatives but that section and the other sections of the act
furnish no express authority for the inauguration of a technique of
decertification. Racial discrimination is, of course, abhorrent to instincts
of fair play and the board's reluctance to see the mantle of its certification cover unions engaging in such conduct is understandable. The
Supreme Court has recently upheld the constitutionality of legislation
designed to prevent just such practices by unions.100 On the other hand,
delegations of Congressional power should not lightly be implied. It
is difficult to conclude that a function admittedly investigatory in nature
furnishes the basis for an implication that it m~y be used to eliminate
98
Section IO{c) deals with the judicial enforcement of board orders prohibiting
unfair labor practices by employers. No other procedur~ for enforcement are found
in the act.
99
Section 2, Ninth of The Railway Labor Act [48 Stat L. n85 at u88 (1934)]
provides, so far as pertinent: "Ninth [Disputes as to who are employees' representatives,
investigation by Mediation Board; elections.] If any dispute shall arise among a carrier's employees as to who are the I representatives of such employees designated and
authorized in accordance with the requirements of this Act, it shall be the duty of the
Mediation' Board, upon request of either p;irty to the dispute, to investigate such dispute
and to certify to both parties, in writing, within thirty days after the receipt of the
invocation of its services, the name or names of the· individuals or organizations that
have been designated and authorized to represent the employees involved in the dispute, and to certify the same to the carrier."
100
Railway Mail Association v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88, 65 S. Ct. 1483, 16 LAB.

REL. REP. 610 (1945).
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undesirable practices not expressly prohibited by the statute and for
which no administrative machinery is provided.
An analogy between a certification and a license might be suggested.
Ordinarily, where a governmental agency grants a license, the grantor
has been held to have an implied power to revoke or modify the license.
Generally speaking, where licenses are issued by a governmental authority, the holding of such a license is a prerequisite to engagement
in a particular activity. And usually the carrying on of such activity
without a license is subject to criminal or civil sanctions. An NLRB
certification, however, is not a con,dition precedent to recognition of a
union as exclusive bargaining agent of the employees within an appropriate unit. If the union represents a majority of the employees, '
the employer is free to bargain with the union. If a certified union
possessing majority status were to discriminate against negroes by failing to represent them fairly, within the meaning of the statutory requirements, as defined in the Steele and Tunstall cases, the employer
might continue to deal with the union despite a revocation of the certification by NLRB. In such an event, it does not appear that any
unfair labor pra.ctice would be presented. If so, the NLRB's revocation
· of the certification would constitute an ineffective gesture. In view of
the carefulness in draftsmanship which the NLRB reflects, such a result
could not have been contemplated by the proponents of the statute. It
renders doubtful the validity of an implication of a power to revoke.
Similarly, a refusal to certify under similar circumstances, would likewise be ineffective so far as the board's prohibitory powers are con-,
cerned, if voluntary recognition of the union by the employer should
take place and if the union enjoyed majority status.

V
CONCLUSION

An NLRB certification has been defined as "a statement of fact
that the union has been designated by a majority of the employees in
an appropriate unit as their bargaining representatives and that it is
the exclusive bargaining representative of all the employees in such
unit." 101 The definition is incomplete. For the certification has become
101

Hearings before the Special Committee to Investigate Executive Agencies on
the War Labor Board and the National Labor Relations Board, 79th Cong., 1st sess.,
p. 1222 (1945).
.
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increasingly an instrument of governmental control of labor relations.
The reconciliation of the principles of freedom with those of order and
stability is a continuing process. The granting or withholding of the.
certification has come to be the administrative mechanism for resolving
whatever conflicts there may be between these interests in a fashion
compatible with democratic growth.
The problem is one which has been met in many and varied phases
of the development of social institutions. Not infrequently order and
stability have been euphemisms for the results of processes designed to
thwart the expression of the majority will. The development of a
doctrine of administrative stability within the framework of democratic
principles has been a conspicuous achievement of the board in the administration of the act.

